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Immigration has become a focal point of many political campaigns, 
most notably that of President Trump in 2016 and again in 2020.  Populist 
rhetoric also decries immigrant workers for taking Americans’ jobs and 
depressing wages for U.S.-born workers.  Yet immigrants serve a 
constructive role by working in some of the most dangerous occupations 
in the country.  It is well-known that immigrant workers, particularly 
those from Mexico with limited English language skills, face a higher 
workplace fatality rate than native workers.  Efforts to reverse this trend 
have long been the focus of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), which undertook numerous policy initiatives 
under the Bush and Obama Administrations to reduce immigrant 
fatalities in the workplace. 
Using three different datasets, this Article empirically shows that, 
while job safety has improved for immigrant workers, more gains are 
required to reduce immigrant fatality rates to align with those of native 
workers.  In reaching this result, we make several contributions to the 
literature.  First, we use recent data from the Census of Fatal Occupational 
Injuries (CFOI) to show that immigrants, particularly those from Mexico, 
experienced higher fatality rates than native-born workers in 2003, 2007, 
and 2015.  Second, we empirically demonstrate that a large group of 
recent immigrants to the United States, as reported in the New Immigrant 
Survey, either remain in high-risk jobs or increase their fatality risks over 
time.  In doing so, we are the first researchers to exploit the longitudinal 
nature of the New Immigrant Survey to assess whether immigrant 
workers progressed into safer jobs between 2003 and 2007.  Finally, we 
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provide updated estimates of the Value of Statistical Life for immigrant 
workers using recent fatality data from the 2015 CFOI.  Here, we show that 
unlike native-born workers, immigrant workers—especially those from 
Mexico—are not only in higher-risk jobs but also not compensated with 
hazard pay for workplace fatality risks.  
In conjunction, these results show that, while OSHA’s outreach 
programs toward immigrants have served a constructive function, more 
can be done to communicate job risks to immigrant workers to help them 
progress into safer jobs.  In particular, since immigrant workers who lack 
English proficiency suffer most in the labor market, we recommend that 
OSHA target its outreach programs toward providing safety materials in 
an immigrant worker’s native language to alert workers to the hazards 
that are present and to promote safety training that immigrant workers 
can understand.  Additionally, we also suggest that OSHA conduct a 
benefit-cost analysis to assess alternative regulatory policies that 
mandate employers to provide safety and training materials in other 
languages, such as Spanish. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Immigration has become a focal point of many political campaigns, 
most notably that of President Trump in 2016 and again in 2020.1  In 
addition, populist rhetoric decries immigrants for “taking American 
jobs” and depressing wages for U.S.-born workers.2  Yet, despite these 
notions, it is also the case that immigrants serve a constructive function 
for the U.S. economy through their work in some of the most dangerous 
occupations in the country.  In 2018, immigrants disproportionately 
worked in the farming, fishing, forestry, and construction occupations 
relative to U.S.-born workers,3 which are among the country’s most 
dangerous occupations.4  On average, immigrant workers, particularly 
those from Mexico, also have a higher workplace fatality rate than 
native-born workers.5   
The fact that immigrants face higher workplace mortality risks has 
not gone unnoticed by academics or policymakers.  The Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which is tasked with 
protecting both U.S.-born and immigrant workers in their workplaces, 
has engaged in many outreach or educational programs to reduce 
 
 1 Making America Great Again: Immigration | President Donald Trump 
Accomplishments, PROMISES MADE, PROMISES KEPT!, https://www.promiseskept.com/
achievement/overview/immigration [https://web.archive.org/web/202001020426
09/https://www.promiseskept.com/achievement/overview/immigration/] (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2020); Daniel Bush, Where President Trump Stands on the Issues in 2020, 
PBS NEWS HOUR (June 19, 2019, 5:16 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/
where-president-trump-stands-on-the-issues-in-2020 (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).  
 2 Josh Boak, AP Fact Check: Trump Plays on Immigration Myths, PBS NEWS HOUR (Feb. 
8, 2019, 10:44 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ap-fact-check-trump-
plays-on-immigration-myths (quoting President Trump as saying, “[w]orking-class 
Americans are left to pay the price for mass illegal immigration: reduced jobs, lower 
wages, overburdened schools, hospitals that are so crowded you can’t get in, increased 
crime, and a depleted social safety net”). 
 3 Census of Fatal Occupation Injuries (CFOI)––Current and Revised Data, U.S. BUREAU 
OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm#rates (last visited Jan. 15, 
2020). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See generally Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Immigrant Status and the Value of 
Statistical Life, 45 J. HUMAN RES. 749 (2010). 
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immigrant fatalities on the job site.6  Likewise, many academics have 
demonstrated empirically that immigrants on average experience a 
higher workplace fatality rate than U.S.-born workers and, more 
concerning, that some groups of immigrants receive little or no 
compensation for these job risks.7  In light of OSHA’s efforts to address 
immigrant fatalities along with the academic research showing that 
immigrants fare poorly in the workplace, this Article offers an updated 
picture of workplace fatality risks for immigrants.  In doing so, this 
Article provides new empirical evidence that immigrants experience 
higher average fatality risks than U.S.-born workers, that many 
immigrants fail to progress into safer jobs over time, and that immigrant 
workers, especially those from Mexico, are not compensated through 
hazard pay for their job risks.  This Article, therefore, serves not only as 
an update to results in the economics literature but also provides insight 
into the effectiveness of OSHA’s efforts to reduce immigrant fatalities.  
In addition, this Article is the first to demonstrate that many immigrants 
fail to transition to safer jobs over time using data from the New 
Immigrant Survey (NIS).   
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II provides contextual 
demographic information about the immigrant population in the United 
States before concluding by showing that immigrants 
disproportionately work in the most dangerous occupations in the 
United States.  
Part III shows that immigrants experience higher average fatality 
rates than U.S.-born workers and that many immigrants remain locked 
into high-risk jobs over time.  To conduct this analysis, we first explain 
our procedure for the construction of fatality rates using the CFOI 
dataset in Section III.A.  We then apply the fatality rates in Section III.B 
to data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to show that 
immigrants bear a disproportionate share of workplace fatalities and 
have a higher average fatality rate than U.S.-born workers.  Finally, 
Section III.C concludes by using data from the NIS to empirically 
demonstrate that a substantial portion of new immigrants in the United 
States remained in high-risk jobs between the two waves of the NIS.   
 
 6 See infra Section VI.A.  
 7 Christen G. Byler, Hispanic/Latino Fatal Occupational Injury Rates, MONTHLY LAB. 
REV., Feb. 2013 at 14; Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 749; Pia M. Orrenius & Madeline 
Zavodny, Do Immigrants Work in Riskier Jobs?, 46 DEMOGRAPHY 535 (2009); Scott 
Richardson, et al., Appendix D: Hispanic Workers in the United States: An Analysis of 
Employment Distributions, Fatal Occupational Injuries, and Non-Fatal Occupational 
Injuries and Illnesses, in SAFETY IS SEGURIDAD: A WORKSHOP SUMMARY 43, 43 (Nat’l Rsch. 
Council, 2003); Katherine Loh & Scott Richardson, Foreign-Born Workers: Trends in Fatal 
Occupational Injuries, 1996–2001, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 2005, at 42, 42.  
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Of course, showing that immigrants experience a higher average 
fatality risk than native-born workers or remain locked into high-risk 
jobs is only part of the story, since it may be the case that immigrants 
simply prefer high-risk jobs.  We must therefore ask whether 
immigrants receive wage compensation in return for their above-
average job risks.  Before answering this question empirically, we first 
describe in Part IV how it is theoretically possible for immigrants and 
native workers to be paid differently for job risks for the same job.  In 
short, we explain that immigrants and U.S.-born workers can receive 
different wage compensation for job risks if the labor market is 
segregated so that immigrants face a different set of job options than do 
non-immigrants.8  Put another way, the available wage rate offered in 
the market for any given level of risk differs for native and immigrant 
workers.  Accordingly, immigrant workers may select a high-risk job 
from the options available to them, but they may not receive the same 
level of wage compensation for these risks that other workers who face 
a different wage-offer curve receive.  Part IV also provides background 
information on the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL), which quantifies the 
benefit of avoiding a fatality, for our VSL estimations in Part V.   
Part V provides our primary results.  This Part first outlines the 
data and methodology used to show that immigrants do not receive 
hazard pay and describes other results in the literature that also 
illustrate that immigrants are not compensated for job risks.  This Part 
then provides our empirical estimates and reports our primary result 
that immigrant workers, particularly those from Mexico, fail to receive 
hazard pay for their fatality risks.  We show that in 2015 this failure, on 
average, cost immigrants over $500 in lost annual wages and that 
Mexican immigrants were underpaid by nearly $1,000 annually because 
they did not receive compensation for job risks.9  The results in this Part, 
in conjunction with those developed in Part III, complete the picture of 
immigrants in the workforce: immigrants face a higher average fatality 
rate than native workers, remain locked into high-risk jobs over time, 
and, in the case of Mexican immigrants, do not receive adequate wage 
compensation for their fatality risk.   
Part VI outlines our policy recommendations that OSHA can 
undertake to reduce immigrant fatalities.  This Part begins by 
summarizing OSHA’s policies toward the immigrant-worker population 
in the United States.  In particular, Section VI.A documents that OSHA’s 
interest in improving immigrant workers’ welfare in the labor force 
 
 8 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 752. 
 9 See infra Section V.D. 
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dates back to the George W. Bush administration,10 grew under the 
Barack Obama administration,11 and continued, though perhaps with 
less force, under the Donald Trump administration.12  Part VI next 
discusses our results in light of OSHA’s policies to reduce immigrant 
workplace fatalities and makes several policy recommendations 
regarding how OSHA can increase immigrant-worker safety.   
Overall, the results developed in this Article show that OSHA could 
have done more to improve immigrant welfare in the workplace under 
the Bush and Obama Administrations.13  First, immigrant fatality rates 
were roughly the same in 2003 and 2007—a period that spans OSHA’s 
outreach programs under the Bush Administration.  To be sure, OSHA’s 
policies at this time may have prevented immigrant fatality rates from 
being higher than they would have been absent OSHA’s efforts.  
Nevertheless, immigrant workers failed to improve relative to U.S.-born 
workers—as evidenced by the fact that both immigrant-worker fatality 
rates and U.S.-born-worker fatality rates were constant.  This persistent 
fatality rate gap creates potential opportunities for government policies 
to improve workplace safety for immigrant workers to be comparable 
to that of native American workers.  
In addition to the lack of progress in immigrant safety at the 
economy-wide level, individual workers also failed to progress into 
safer jobs over time.  We show that from 2003 to 2007 immigrants 
remained locked into high-risk jobs and immigrant workers, especially 
Mexican immigrants, did not receive hazard pay for their higher job 
risks.  Under the Bush Administration, OSHA engaged in several 
community outreach programs to improve immigrant welfare, 
including the creation of a national clearinghouse for training programs 
in Spanish, a Spanish-language website for employees and employers, 
the establishment of an 800 number for Spanish-speaking workers, and 
 
 10 See, e.g., John L. Henshaw, Assistant Sec’y of Lab, Dep’t of Lab., Statement before 
the Subcommittee on Employment, Safety and Training (Feb. 27, 2002), 
https://www.osha.gov/news/testimonies/02272002 (explaining the creation of the 
Hispanic Worker’s Task Force).  
 11 Press Release, Dep’t of Lab., National Action Summit for Latino Worker Health & 
Safety (Apr. 14–15, 2010), https://www.osha.gov/archive/latinosummit/index.html 
(outlining the creation of a summit to discuss Latino worker safety). 
 12 See, e.g., Training Resources in Spanish Language, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/dte/outreach/construction_generalindustry/spanish_
training.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2020) (providing training resources for Spanish-
speaking workers); Annual Alliance Report, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., 
https://www.osha.gov/alliances/regional/region6/alliance-annual-report_20190726 
(last visited Jan. 13, 2020) (outlining OSHA’s outreach programs in Texas under the 
Trump Administration). 
 13 We narrow our focus to the Bush and Obama Administrations, rather than the 
Trump Administration as well, because our data only span these two administrations.  
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several local outreach programs to distribute safety materials in 
Spanish.  Though these programs appear to be constructive efforts that 
are well-suited to addressing the obstacles posed by language barriers, 
more vigorous and effective efforts are needed.  
In addition, our results also suggest that, while OSHA’s outreach 
efforts under the Obama Administration seemed to be well-suited to 
enhancing immigrant workers’ welfare, they were inadequate by 
themselves to eliminate the labor market challenges facing immigrant 
workers.  Notably, in 2010, OSHA organized a national summit with over 
five hundred attendees—such as labor union members and community 
leaders—to address immigrant fatalities, particularly in the Latino 
community.  Follow-up summits held across the country emerged after 
the national summit to develop ways to provide immigrant workers 
with education, training, and assistance.  Conferences such as these 
provide an alert regarding immigrants’ higher job risks, but they were 
ultimately insufficient to improve immigrant outcomes nationwide.  We 
show that immigrant workers still suffered in the labor market relative 
to native workers between 2007 and 2015.  For instance, Section III.B 
shows that the fatality rate for immigrants was higher than U.S.-born 
workers in 2007 and 2015, and Section V.D shows that immigrants, 
especially those from Mexico, did not receive hazard pay for bearing 
these risks during this time.  Again, it may be the case that but for OSHA’s 
policies, the picture for immigrants could be even bleaker than it already 
is.  Even so, our data does not show that the safety and risk 
compensation of immigrant workers improved relative to native 
workers: U.S.-born workers had a lower fatality rate than immigrants 
and, unlike immigrants, received hazard pay for job risks in 2007 and 
2015, suggesting that immigrants did not improve relative to U.S.-born 
workers.   
OSHA engaged in many outreach efforts toward immigrant 
workers under both the Bush and Obama Administrations, such as the 
creation of the Hispanic Worker’s Task Force in 2002 and the National 
Action Summit for Latino Worker Health & Safety in 2010.  While these 
programs seem quite appropriate, we think that the continued 
immigrant–native worker gap in labor market outcomes with respect to 
risk levels and risk compensation creates opportunities to narrow this 
gap.  Based on prior research showing that immigrants not fluent in 
English suffer relative to immigrants more adept in English,14 we make 
a modest recommendation that, so long as the programs’ benefits 
exceed their costs, OSHA engage in more targeted programs aimed at 
 
 14 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 768. 
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delivering safety materials to immigrant workers in their native 
language.  Focusing on Spanish-speaking immigrant workers is an ideal 
starting point, given that Mexican workers face the highest fatality risk 
levels and receive no corresponding compensation in wages.  Through 
initiatives like this, OSHA can educate immigrant workers that lack 
English skills about the job risks that they face in their workplaces and 
the precautions that they might take to reduce these risks.  This could 
then encourage immigrant workers to transition into safer jobs—or at 
least jobs that will compensate them for their fatality risks.  
We also recommend that, subject to a benefit-cost test, OSHA take 
a more aggressive stance and promulgate regulations mandating that 
employers provide safety and training materials in a language that their 
workers can understand.  Currently, OSHA has dozens of regulations 
designed to convey job risks to workers through safety data sheets, 
training manuals, and labels across all major industries.  Many of these 
regulations, however, do not require this training to occur in any 
language other than English.15  Because these training materials 
potentially serve as a mechanism for informing immigrant workers, we 
recommend that OSHA mandate that employers translate safety 
materials into an immigrant worker’s native language.  Because there 
are multiple training and risk communication efforts that are possible, 
where these vary in their stringency and their cost, we recommend that 
OSHA adopt the approach that has the greatest net benefits to society, 
i.e., benefits less costs.  In recognition that most immigrant workers in 
dangerous occupations speak Spanish, we recommend that OSHA 
initiate pilot programs with requirements that training materials be 
translated into Spanish, since these regulations will likely pass a cost-
benefit test.  Next, we suggest that OSHA investigate the costs and 
benefits of expanding language requirements to include translations 
into languages beyond English and Spanish.  For occupations that 
employ many immigrants that do not speak Spanish or English, it may 
be socially optimal for OSHA to require safety materials to be translated 
into a language that that particular group of immigrants understands.  
In safety-training situations in which training is communicated verbally 
to workers, OSHA should require that safety procedures be 
communicated in a language that the workers can read or speak.   
 
 
 15 See infra Section VI.A. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
Before deriving the empirical results reached in this Article, this 
Part offers a broad summary of the demographic characteristics of 
immigrants in the United States along with an overview of the types of 
occupations that employ immigrants.  Section A provides an overview 
of the average demographic characteristics of immigrants in the United 
States and Section B describes the types of jobs in which immigrants 
work.   
A.  Broad Summary of Immigrant Characteristics  
This Section provides a broad overview of demographic 
characteristics of the immigrant population in the United States in order 
to contextualize this Article’s findings with the immigrant population, 
generally.   
In 2017, more than 44.5 million immigrants resided in the United 
States.16  Since the year 2000, immigrants have composed between 11 
and 14 percent of the population of the United States.17  Furthermore, 
immigration is on the rise.  After a low in the 1970s, immigration has 
again approached historical levels, and the immigrant share of the 
population has reached highs not seen since before World War I.18  
Immigrants also composed about 17 percent of the labor force in 2019.19   
Education attainment among immigrants is similar to that of 
United States natives.  In 2016, approximately 32 percent of immigrants 
age twenty-five or older had a bachelor’s degree or higher relative to 34 
percent of U.S.-born adults.20  At the opposite end of the spectrum, 
immigrants were much more likely than U.S.-born adults to have less 
than a ninth-grade education.  Over 16 percent of immigrants had less 
than a ninth-grade education, compared with 1.9 percent of the native-
born population.21  The median age for the immigrant population in 
2018 was greater than that of the U.S.-born population, with a median 
 
 16 U.S. Immigrant Population and Share over Time, 1850-Present, MIGRATION POLICY 
INST., https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/immigrant-
population-over-time (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
 17 Id.  
 18 Id.  
 19 Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force 
Characteristics—2019 (May 15, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/
forbrn.pdf. 
 20 Christine Gambino, Random Samplings: Immigrant Families and Educational 
Attainment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.census.gov/
newsroom/blogs/random-samplings/2017/03/immigrant_familiesa.html.  
 21 Id. 
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age of 45.2 years for immigrants compared to 36.3 years for natives.22  
Women comprised about 52 percent of the immigrant population in 
201823 compared with about 51.1 percent of the native-born 
population.24  Unsurprisingly, immigrant populations are frequently of 
limited English proficiency; approximately 47 percent of immigrants 
over age five were of limited English proficiency.25   
Turning next to national origin, Mexican immigrants compose the 
largest group of immigrants in the United States by a large margin.  
Approximately one in four immigrants in the United States are from 
Mexico.26  For comparison, Indians and Chinese were among the next 
two largest immigrant groups, comprising approximately 6 and 5 
percent of the immigrant population, respectively.27  Forty-four percent 
of U.S. immigrants reported having Hispanic or Latino origins.28  
It is worthwhile to briefly narrow in on Mexican immigrants, since 
they bear a significant portion of workplace fatalities.29  Note that these 
statistics are for all Mexican immigrants regardless of documentation 
status.  Mexican immigrants ages twenty-five and older have much 
lower educational attainment than either the native-born population or 
other non-Mexican immigrant populations.30  In 2019, roughly 53 
percent of Mexican immigrants lacked a high school diploma, compared 
to 26 percent of non-Mexican immigrants and 8 percent of the U.S.-born 
population.31  Fewer than 8 percent of Mexican immigrants had a 
bachelor’s degree or higher.32  Overall, immigrants from Mexico are 
slightly younger than all immigrants but older than the U.S.-born 
 
 22 Jeanne Batalova et al., Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and 
Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Feb. 14, 2020), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-
and-immigration-united-states. 
 23 AM. IMMIGRANT COUNCIL, IMMIGRANT WOMEN AND GIRLS IN THE UNITED STATES: A PORTRAIT 
OF DEMOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY (2020), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/
default/files/research/immigrant_women_in_the_united_states.pdf. 
 24 Kaiser Family Foundation, Population Distribution by Sex, https://www.kff.org/
other/state-indicator/distribution-by-sex/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%
22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited February 9, 
2020). 
 25 Emma Israel & Jeanne Batalova, Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 
MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
mexican-immigrants-united-states#AgeEducationEmployment.  
 26 Id.  
 27 Id.  
 28 Id.  
 29 See generally Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5.  
 30 Israel & Batalova, supra note 25. 
 31 Id.  
 32 Id.  
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population.33  Finally, the Mexican immigrant population is less likely to 
be proficient in English than the overall foreign-born population.34  
Sixty-six percent of Mexican immigrants reported limited English 
proficiency in 2019 relative to 46 percent of all immigrants.35   
B.  Immigrant Distribution in the Labor Force 
Because this Article focuses on immigrants in the workplace, this 
Section provides a broad overview of where immigrants work in the 
American economy.  In 2019, there were over twenty-eight million 
foreign-born workers in the U.S. labor force, about 17 percent of the 
total labor force.36  Moreover, immigrants disproportionately work in 
some of America’s most dangerous jobs.  According to the most recent 
2019 statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1.7 percent of 
immigrants work in farming, fishing, and forestry occupations 
compared to just 0.5 percent of the native population.37  In particular, 
immigrant workers dominated the construction occupation.  Nearly 10 
percent of the immigrant population work in construction while only 4.5 
percent of the native population work in this occupation.38  The 
construction occupation is among the most dangerous in the country, 
with a fatality rate of 12.9 deaths per 100,000 workers.39   
In contrast, immigrants are also disproportionately less likely to 
work in safer occupations.  Though 18 percent of native-born workers 
are employed in the management occupations, only 13.1 percent of 
immigrants work in these types of jobs.40  Similarly, the professional 
occupations—such as computer engineering, education, and law—
employ fewer immigrants than native workers.  Overall, 20.8 percent of 
immigrants were employed in these occupations compared to 24.2 
percent of natives.41  Importantly, these occupations are among the 
safest.  The fatality rate for the management occupations is 1.5 deaths 
 
 33 Id. (Mexican immigrants were forty-five years old on average, compared to forty-
six years for all immigrants and thirty-seven years for U.S.-born population).  
 34 Id. 
 35 Id.  
 36 U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., supra note 19. 
 37 Id.  
 38 Id.  
 39 U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES (CFOI)––CURRENT, 
https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm#rates (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (available as a 
downloadable spreadsheet titled Hours-based fatal injury rates by industry, occupation, 
and selected demographic characteristics, 2019, Census of Fatal Occupation Injuries––
Current and Revised Data).   
 40 U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., supra note 19. 
 41 Id.  
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per 100,000 workers, while the fatality rate for the professional 
occupations is 0.7 deaths.42   
The economics and policy literatures also find that immigrants, 
particularly Hispanic immigrants, work in the most dangerous 
occupations.  Among the first to study this issue, Richardson, Ruser, and 
Saurez (2003)43 and Loh and Richardson (2004)44 both found that 
Hispanic workers have a higher fatality risk than the average worker.  
Orrenius and Zavodny (2009) found that immigrants, compared to 
native U.S. workers, work in riskier jobs.45  In a methodology akin to that 
used in this Article, Hersch and Viscusi (2010) showed that immigrants 
overall have a higher fatality rate than native U.S. workers and that this 
difference is driven by Mexican immigrants.46  They also showed that 
non-Mexican immigrants face a lower fatality rate than native U.S. 
workers.47  Finally, the most recent work in this area is a study published 
in the Monthly Labor Review by Byler (2013), which found that 
Hispanic/Latino workers have a higher overall occupational fatality rate 
than that of all workers and that foreign-born Hispanic/Latino workers 
experience higher injury rates than native-born Hispanic/Latino 
workers in certain occupations, such as sales or protective services.48   
Overall, immigrants compose a disproportionate share of the 
dangerous occupations than U.S.-born workers.  Many OSHA policies—
including those dedicated toward helping immigrants49—are designed 
to improve safety in these dangerous industries.  Accordingly, the 
remainder of this Article will address how immigrants fare in the 
workplace, with particular attention given to the traditional blue-collar 
occupations that have the highest fatality rates.50   
 
 42 U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., supra note 39.  
 43 Richardson et al. supra note 7, at 43.  
 44 Loh & Richardson, supra note 7, at 42. 
 45 Orrenius & Zavodny, supra note 7, at 535. 
 46 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 758.  
 47 Id.  
 48 Byler, supra note 7, at 14.  
 49 See infra Section VI.A; see also supra note 10 and surrounding text.  
 50 The nine occupations that we designate as blue-collar occupations are: (i) 
healthcare practitioner and technical occupations, and healthcare support occupations; 
(ii) protective service occupations; (iii) food preparation and serving related 
occupations; (iv) building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations; (v) 
personal care and service occupations; (vi) farming, fishery, and forestry, and 
construction and extraction occupations; (vii) installation, maintenance, and repair 
occupations; (viii) production occupations; and (ix) transportation and material moving 
occupations.  
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III.  COMPARING RISK LEVELS FOR IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVE WORKERS 
Previous research indicates that immigrants work in riskier jobs 
than U.S.-born workers, as measured by the average workplace fatality 
rates for these two groups.  This Part updates that research using the 
newest data available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and shows 
that immigrants still have an average workplace fatality rate higher than 
native workers.  In addition, this Part also shows that immigrants 
remain locked into high-risk jobs over time using data from the NIS, a 
panel dataset that collected demographic, job, and other information on 
8,573 new immigrants in 2003 and 2007.  This Article is the first to use 
the NIS to assess how immigrants are progressing over time with 
respect to the riskiness of their employment.  Section A of this Part 
describes our methodology for constructing fatality rates for three 
different risk measures.  Section B uses these fatality rates to compare 
immigrant and U.S.-born risk levels.  Finally, Section C shows that a 
substantial portion of immigrants in the NIS remained in high-risk jobs 
between 2003 and 2007.  
A.  Construction of Fatality Rates 
This Section explains our methodology for constructing the fatality 
rates used in Sections III.B, III.C, and V.D of this Article.  We follow the 
latest methodology used in the economics literature, which is also 
consistent with the general procedure used by the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, to create hours-based fatality rates.51  A fatality rate measures 
the number of deaths per 100,000 workers.  For instance, a fatality rate 
of 4.0 would mean that four workers died for every 100,000 workers.  
The source of our fatality information is the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ CFOI.  The CFOI is a comprehensive census of all job-related 
fatalities in which each fatality is verified with multiple sources, 
including a worker’s death certificate and worker’s compensation 
record.52  The CFOI captures every fatality in the workplace and is 
widely accepted as the best data source for worker fatalities.53  In 
addition to information on the worker’s age, industry, and occupation, 
 
 51 Elissa Philip Gentry & W. Kip Viscusi, The Fatality and Morbidity Components of 
the Value of Statistical Life, 46 J. HEALTH ECON. 90, 92 (2016) [hereinafter Gentry and 
Viscusi (2016)]; see also W. Kip Viscusi, Using Data from the Census of Fatal Occupational 
Injuries to Estimate the “Value of a Statistical Life”, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 2013, at 1, 2; 
Elissa Philip Gentry & W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of a Statistical Life for Transportation 
Regulations: A Test of the Benefits Transfer Methodology, 51 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 53 
(2015).   
 52 Gentry & Viscusi (2016), supra note 51, at 92. 
 53 Id.; Viscusi, supra note 51, at 2. 
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the CFOI data includes information on the worker’s country of origin, 
which we leverage to construct fatality rates specific to immigrants.   
We construct three different fatality rate measures based on three 
different units of analysis.  These three measures are fatality rates 
indexed by industry, industry-immigrant status, and industry-
occupation.  To illustrate what a fatality rate for a given index means, 
consider the construction of fatality rates by industry.  A fatality rate of 
1.2 for the publishing industry would mean that there were 1.2 deaths 
per 100,000 workers in the publishing industry.  We construct fifty such 
industries based on the Census codes and define industries using the 
same procedure as Gentry and Viscusi (2016).54  
To explain how we construct fatality rates, consider the procedure 
used to create fatality rates indexed by industry.  Constructing fatality 
rates first requires determining the value of the numerator—that is, we 
must determine the number of deaths in each industry for each year.  To 
do so, we sum the total number of fatalities in each industry for workers 
between ages 16 and 64.  This summed value is the numerator in the 
fatality rate.   
Next, we must calculate the denominator.  For this calculation, we 
follow the accepted hours-based fatality rate procedure and calculate 
the number of worker-hours in each industry cell using data from the 
National Bureau of Economic Research’s Merged Outgoing Rotation 
Groups from the CPS.55  The CPS is published by the U.S. Census Bureau 
and is widely used in the labor economics literature as an accurate 
measure of the workforce.56  To calculate the number of hours, we 
multiply the average reported hours worked by employees in each 
industry by the number of employed workers in that industry.  This 
value is the denominator for the fatality rate for a given year. 
As a final note, because few deaths occur in some industries or 
occupations, we use three-year rolling averages to calculate the fatality 
rate.  Thus, the numerator is the sum of fatalities for three years and the 
denominator is the sum of total hours worked by all employees each 
year for three years.  




 54 Gentry & Viscusi (2016), supra note 51, at 92.  For clarity, we matched the NAICS 
codes in the CFOI to census codes before aggregating the census codes into 50 industries 
according to CPS categories.  
 55 See id.  
 56 See, e.g., Gentry and Viscusi (2016), supra note 51.  
𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
𝑁
𝐸𝐻
 ∗ 200,000,000 
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where N is the number of fatal work injuries, EH is the total hours 
worked by all employees during the calendar year, and 200,000,000 is 
the base for 100,000 full-time employees working a forty-hour 
workweek fifty weeks each year.   
We also construct fatality rates indexed by industry-occupation 
and industry-immigrant status in the same way.57  For the industry-
occupation fatality rates, we divide the sample into an industry-
occupation grid, where the occupations are the nine blue-collar 
occupations that are widely accepted as some of the most dangerous in 
the country, and the fifty industries are the same as those used above.58  
Thus, a fatality rate indexed by industry-occupation refers to the fatality 
rate for a particular industry-occupation combination.  For instance, a 
fatality rate of 1.0 for the publishing industry-transportation occupation 
cell would mean that one person working in the transportation 
occupation in the publishing industry died for every 100,000 workers in 
that job.  Likewise, the fatality rate indexed by industry-immigrant 
status reflects the number of deaths per 100,000 workers in each 
industry based on immigrant status.  We determine whether a fatality in 
the CFOI dataset belonged to an immigrant if the worker was born in a 
foreign region.  
B.  Comparing Immigrant and Native Risk Levels 
This Section uses the fatality rates constructed in Section A to 
compare immigrant and native risks.  We show that immigrants work a 
disproportionate share of fatalities and have a higher average fatality 
rate than native workers. 
1.  Ratio of Immigrant Fatalities to Share of the Workforce 
Immigrants bear a disproportionate share of fatal workplace 
injuries, as evidenced by the fact that the ratio between their share of 
workplace fatalities is greater than their corresponding share of the 
workforce.  Figure 1 plots the share of workplace fatalities belonging to 
immigrants against the share of immigrants in the workforce between 
2003 and 2015.59  Between 2003 and 2015, immigrants composed 
between 11 and 14 percent of the workforce.60  During this time, 
 
 57 For a more detailed discussion of constructing fatality rates based on industry-
occupation groupings, see Gentry & Viscusi (2016), supra note 51, at 92. 
 58 See supra note 50. 
 59 To calculate the share of workplace fatalities belonging to immigrants, we divided 
the number of immigrant fatalities by the total number of fatalities in the CFOI data for 
each year.  
 60 We use data from the CPS to estimate the immigrant share of the workforce.  
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however, they experienced between 15 and 18 percent of workplace 
fatalities.  Accordingly, the relative immigrant share of fatalities 
exceeded 1.0 for each year illustrated in Figure 1.  Though this ratio 
peaked in 2005 at 1.42, it has generally declined since, except for a 
recent bump from 1.06 to 1.16 in 2015, which reversed the downward 
trend of the previous two years.  Nevertheless, compared to the starting 
points in 2003, the curves in Figure 1 have narrowed, as the relative 
share of immigrant fatalities more closely tracks their share in the 
workforce.   
Overall, the fact that immigrants bear a disproportionate share of 
workplace fatalities provides evidence that they generally do worse 
than native workers, at least in terms of job risks.  Moreover, this trend 
has persisted over time; at no time between 2003 and 2015 was the 
ratio between the immigrant share of the workforce and their share of 
fatalities less than 1.0.   
 
Figure 1: Immigrant Share of Fatalities Plotted against Immigrant Share 
of the Workforce61 
 
 
 61 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at 
Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOI research file.  U.S. Bureau of 
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2.  Comparing Immigrant and Native Fatality Rates 
Evidence based on risk levels associated with the workers in the 
CPS also shows that immigrants are concentrated in more dangerous 
jobs than native workers.  The CPS is a large sample dataset that 
includes employment and demographic information for the native U.S. 
workforce along with information on a worker’s country of origin, which 
is used to determine whether the worker is an immigrant.  We describe 
the CPS data in more detail in Section V.A, infra, but for now it is 
sufficient to state that CPS includes information on a worker’s industry, 
occupation, and immigrant status.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for three different fatality 
rate measures—industry, industry-occupation, and industry-
immigrant—for CPS data from 2003, 2007, and 2015.  The data are 
presented for different groups based on immigrant status and, if the 
worker is an immigrant, whether the worker emigrated from Mexico.  
We break out immigrants from Mexico separately because of related 
research showing that they bear the brunt of immigrant fatalities.62  
Table 1 shows that fatality rates for all workers were relatively constant 
between 2003 and 2007, ranging from 4.4 deaths to 6.0 deaths per 
100,000 workers in 2003 and 4.4 to 6.1 deaths per 100,000 workers in 
2007.  In 2015, however, the fatality rate for all workers decreased to 
between 3.3 and 5.2 deaths, depending on the measure, resulting in a 
decrease between 15 and 45 percent from 2007 to 2015.  Immigrants 
experienced a similar trend.  Their fatality rate across the three 
measures was approximately the same in 2003 and 2007, but the 
immigrant fatality rate was between 15 and 32 percent lower from 2007 
to 2015.  Much of this downward trend for both groups is due to the 
change in the industry mix of jobs in the economy. 
In addition, by most fatality measures, immigrants experienced a 
higher average fatality risk than native workers in 2003, 2007, and 
2015.  To illustrate, consider 2007, where immigrants had a higher 
fatality rate than native workers using the industry and industry-
immigrant fatality rate measures.  This was also true in 2003, and in 
2015 immigrants had a higher overall fatality rate than native workers 
across all three measures of job risks.  Additionally, across all three 
years, Mexican immigrants had a substantially higher fatality rate than 
non-Mexican immigrants.  For instance, in 2015, Mexican immigrants’ 
fatality rate ranged from between 60 to 65 percent higher than non-
Mexican immigrants.  Overall, immigrants from Mexico had the highest 
average fatality risk of any group assessed in the CPS.   
 
 62 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 768.  
VISCUSI & MARQUISS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2021  8:29 AM 
950 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:933 
Table 1: Risk Levels for Current Population Survey Sample Groups (rates 














Rate 6.0 6.0 5.8 7.4 4.7 
Industry Rate 4.4 4.4 4.5 5.9 3.6 
Industry-
Immigrant 
Rate 5.0 5.0 5.1 6.6 4.1 
Sample Size 67,857 56,444 11,413 4,660 6,753 














Rate 6.1 6.1 6.0 7.5 4.9 
Industry Rate 4.4 4.3 4.7 5.9 3.7 
Industry-
Immigrant 
Rate 4.8 4.7 5.1 6.5 4.1 
Sample Size 66,872 54,200 12,672 5,392 7,280 














Rate 5.2 5.2 5.4 7 4.4 
Industry Rate 3.5 3.4 3.9 5.1 3.1 
Industry-
Immigrant 
Rate 3.3 3.2 3.5 4.6 2.8 
Sample Size 60,800 49,315 11,485 4,579 6,906 
 
 
 63 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at 
Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOI research file.  U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, supra note 61. 
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C.  Immigrants Remain in High-Risk Jobs over Time 
Our concern with the well-being of immigrant workers would be 
dampened a bit if they were able to move out of high-risk jobs into safer 
pursuits.  But this hopeful scenario is not the case.  In addition to 
experiencing a higher fatality rate, immigrants also remain locked into 
high-risk jobs over time.  This Section uses the NIS to empirically 
demonstrate that a large portion of new immigrants to the United States 
remained in high-risk jobs between the two waves of the NIS.  Most 
strikingly, this pattern holds true for immigrants in the highest quartile 
of job risks—roughly half of all immigrants in this quartile of very risky 
jobs either increase their job risk or remain in a job with roughly the 
same risk level between the two waves.  These results also have 
implications for OSHA policy, which we briefly discuss at the end of this 
Section.   
To conduct our analysis in this Section, we use data from the NIS, 
which is a data source provided by the National Institutes of Health, 
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, and the 
National Institute on Aging/Office of Behavioral and Social Science 
Research.  The NIS sample consists of 8,573 new legal immigrants that 
received permanent resident status in 2003.  The NIS is a panel dataset 
that tracks the same immigrant group across two survey waves.  The 
first wave occurred in 2003, and the second was conducted between 
2007 and 2009.  Panel datasets observe the same individual over 
multiple periods64 and can therefore be used to explore what happens 
to the same person over time.  The NIS collected information on legal 
immigrants on a variety of measures, such as the respondent’s country 
of origin, English reading and writing proficiency, education attainment, 
employment history in the United States and their country of origin, 
gender, and income.  Notably for this Section’s purposes, the NIS also 
asks immigrants which occupation and industry grouping they belong 
to in both waves of the survey.  This information, combined with fatality 
risks for every industry and occupation combination developed in the 
procedure outlined in Section III.B, permits us to analyze how many 
immigrants move from safer jobs to riskier ones, from riskier jobs to 
safer ones, or remain in the same job or risk level.   
Before turning to our main results for this Section reported in 
Figure 2, we first provide summary statistics for the immigrants that 
compose the sample of immigrants for which complete industry and 
occupation data is available for both waves.  This sample consists of 
2,176 observations.  Except for hourly wages and education, Table 2 
 
 64 FUMIO HAYASHI, ECONOMETRICS 323 (2000).  
VISCUSI & MARQUISS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2021  8:29 AM 
952 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:933 
provides summary statistics for every observation used to construct 
Figure 2.  The average hourly wage in Wave 1 was $15.68 per hour, 
which increased to $21.45 in Wave 2.  Since most of the immigrant 
characteristics summarized in Table 2 were relatively constant between 
the two periods, our discussion of this table will focus on the statistics 
in the second wave of the NIS.  The average immigrant had fourteen 
years of education, ten years of work experience in the United States, 
and about 4.4 years of experience with their current employer.  
Approximately 60 percent of the sample is male, and 74 percent of the 
sample is married.  Seven percent worked for the government and 12 
percent belonged to a union.  About 62 percent of the sample spoke 
English and 68 percent understood English.  Finally, 37 percent were 
new arrivals to the United States.  
Table 2: Summary Statistics for the NIS 
  Wave 1   Wave 2 
Variable Mean N   Mean N 
Hourly Wage 15.68 1,743  21.45 1,688 
Age 36.86 2,176  40.64 2,176 
Education (Years) 13.88 2,172  14.07 2,172 
Potential Experience in U.S. 5.06 2,176  9.59 2,176 
Tenure 2.68 2,176  4.37 2,176 
Male  0.60 2,176  0.60 2,176 
Speak English 0.62 2,176  0.62 2,176 
Understand English 0.68 2,176  0.68 2,176 
Married 0.71 2,176  0.74 2,176 
Government Employee  0.05 2,176  0.07 2,176 
Union Member  0.11 2,176  0.12 2,176 
New Arrival 0.37 2,176   0.37 2,176 
 
Bearing this information in mind, we turn next to Figure 2, which 
provides a first-pass assessment of how immigrants moved among safe 
and risky jobs between the first wave of the NIS survey in 2003 and the 
second wave in 2007.  Figure 2 graphs the percentage of workers that 
made a riskier job change, safer job change, or no job change.  We define 
a job change as any change in a worker’s industry or occupation 
category between 2003 and 2007.  For this analysis, we include all 
occupations rather than only blue-collar occupations.65  As an 
 
 65 We impose this restriction later.   
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illustrative example to understand how Figure 2 was created, suppose 
that a person worked as a machinist in a foundry in 2003.  In Wave 1, 
this person would then be classified in the “Metals Manufacturing” 
industry and the “production” occupation.  If in 2007 the worker 
remained at the foundry but became a construction laborer making new 
buildings for the foundry, he would remain in the same industry but 
move to a new occupation group, construction.  Thus, he would be 
classified as a job mover for our purposes, and, in this instance, his 
workplace fatality risk would have increased, so he would be classified 
as a “riskier job changer.”66  We also break out Mexican immigrants 
separately in Figure 2 because previous research and the results 
reported in this Article indicate that Mexican immigrants face the 
highest overall fatality risks and receive the lowest monetary 
compensation for those risks.67   
Figure 2 shows that immigrants are more likely to remain in their 
jobs or switch to riskier jobs than they are to move to safer jobs.  Looking 
first at Mexican immigrants, who composed about 267 of the 2,171 
immigrants for which complete data was available, 38 percent moved to 
a riskier job, 27 percent stayed in the same job, and 35 percent moved 
to a safer job.  Thus, 65 percent of Mexican immigrants in the sample 
made a riskier change or failed to improve their job risk.  To be sure, 
some of the “stayers” were already in safe jobs, but the fact that more 
Mexican immigrants moved to a more dangerous job than moved to a 
safer job shows that a large portion of Mexican immigrants did not get 
safer over time.  Figure 2 also shows that Mexican immigrants are the 
only group who failed to improve their overall level of safety because 
more workers moved to riskier jobs over time than moved into safer 
employment.   
Figure 2 also shows that many non-Mexican immigrants did not 
transition to safer jobs.  Though 36 percent of non-Mexican immigrants 
made a safer job change, the remaining 64 percent of non-Mexican 
immigrants remained in their same job or made a riskier job change.  
Finally, looking at all immigrants, Figure 2 shows that 36 percent of all 
immigrants moved to a safer job, 32 percent found a riskier job, and 32 
percent remained in the same job.  Thus, roughly two out of every three 
immigrants stayed in the same risk group or increased their risk when 
 
 66 This worker would also be classified as a job changer if the worker remained in 
the same machinist occupation in both waves, but moved industries to work for, say, a 
paper mill classified in the Wood Products Manufacturing industry.  Whether this 
change would be classified as a safer or more dangerous change would depend on 
whether the risk of dying in the new job was greater or less than that relative to his old 
job.   
 67 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5; Byler, supra note 7, at 14. 
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they changed jobs.  Again, it is likely that some of the “stayers” were 
already in safe jobs, but the fact that nearly one-third of immigrants 
moved to a riskier job is indicative of the fact that many immigrants 
failed to improve in terms of workplace safety.  
Stepping back, Figure 2 illustrates overall that a substantial portion 
of immigrants did not sort themselves into safer jobs between 2003 and 
2007.  This, in conjunction with the fact that immigrants face higher job 
risks overall,68 suggests that immigrants enter jobs with high fatality 
risks when they first arrive, and then a substantial proportion, based on 
the results of Figure 2, fail to move into safer jobs as time progresses.   
These results inform our understanding of the lack of immigrant 
progress under the Bush Administration.  Although OSHA policies may 
have encouraged some immigrants to transfer into safer occupations 
over time, Figure 2 shows that a large portion of immigrants switched 
to a higher-risk job between 2003 and 2007.   
 
Figure 2: Changes in Job Risk (Percentages)69 
 
Another way to assess whether immigrants substantially sort into 
safer jobs is to explore how immigrants change job risks based on their 
Wave 1 risk quartile.  We conduct this analysis in Figures 3, 4, and 5.  To 
 
 68 See infra Section III.B.  
 69 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at 
Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOI research file.  U.S. Bureau of 
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construct these figures, we divide immigrants into four different risk 
groups based on the fatality rate that they faced in their industry-
occupation combination in the first wave of the NIS survey.  The first 
quartile consists of immigrants in the lowest 25 percent of job risks, the 
second quartile consists of immigrants in the second-lowest 25 percent 
of job risks, and so on.  We classify an immigrant as belonging to the “No 
Risk Change” group if the fatality rate for the immigrant’s second job 
was within 10 percent of the fatality rate for the immigrant’s first job in 
Wave 1 of the NIS.  To illustrate, suppose a person’s job had a fatality 
rate of 1.0 death per 100,000 workers in Wave 1 of the NIS.  This person 
would belong to the second quartile in Wave 1.70  If the fatality rate of 
their second job was 0.90 deaths per 100,000 workers, this person 
would be classified in the “No Risk Change.”  If, however, this person 
moved to a job that had a fatality rate of 0.89 deaths per 100,000 
workers, they would belong to the “Risk Decreased” group.  If their 
second job had a fatality rate of greater than 1.1 deaths per 100,000 
workers, they would belong to the “Risk Increased” group.   
Figures 3, 4, and 5 are useful because they permit analyzing 
whether immigrants remained in approximately the same risk group in 
both waves of the NIS survey or if they increased or decreased their risk 
between the two waves.  In short, these figures provide a finer 
framework in which to analyze how immigrants fare in terms of job 
risks over time.  If a large portion of immigrants is moving to a higher-
risk quartile or remaining in the same risk quartile, we have evidence 
suggesting that immigrants are not sorting themselves into safer jobs 
over time.  Figures 3, 4, and 5 are based on 2,158 total observations.71  
 
 70 The risk groups in the four quartiles in Figures 3, 4, and 5 are as follows: The first 
quartile includes all immigrants with workplace fatality risks between zero and 0.76 
deaths per 100,000 workers.  The second quartile includes all immigrants with 
workplace fatality risks between 0.76 and 1.14 deaths.  The third quartile includes all 
immigrants with fatality risks between 1.15 and 2.81 deaths.  Finally, the fourth quartile 
includes all immigrants with fatality risks between 2.82 and 35.88 deaths per 100,000.  
 71 The observations are lower because we lack some fatality rates for some industry-
occupation groups due to the nature of the construction of fatality rates indexed by 
industry-occupation.  Otherwise, the 2,158 observations that we have data for perfectly 
overlap with the 2,176 observations used to construct Figure 2.  
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Figure 3: Risk Changes by Quartile, All Immigrants (Percentages)72 
 
Figure 3 analyzes risk changes for all immigrants for which 
information was available.  The first quartile of Figure 3 shows that 63 
percent of immigrant workers moved to a job with a higher fatality risk 
in the second wave of the NIS survey.  To be sure, those in the lowest 
risk group that switch jobs are hard pressed to find a job with a similar 
or lower fatality rate, but the fact that nearly two-thirds of workers in 
the first quartile increased their risk suggests some immigrants are not 
remaining in safe jobs over time.  Indeed, this phenomenon is born out 
in the other three quartile groups as well.  In each of the three groups, 
about 50 percent of immigrants decreased their risks, but the other 50 
percent remained in the same risk group or moved to a job with a higher 
fatality risk between the first and second waves of the NIS.  Notably, 
nearly one out of every two immigrants in the fourth quartile—which 
consists of those in the most dangerous jobs and is, therefore, most 
indicative of how immigrants are doing in terms of job safety—
increased their fatality risk or failed to move to a job with a lower fatality 
risk.  Overall, Figure 3 illustrates that though there has certainly been 
 
 72 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at 
Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOI research file.  U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, supra note 61.  The risk-quartiles in Figures 3, 4, and 5 are as follows: 
The first quartile consists of the safest industry-occupation groups with the lowest 
fatality rates.  The second quartile includes the second safest industry-occupation 
groups.  The third quartile includes the third safest industry-occupation groups.  The 
fourth quartile includes the most dangerous industry-occupation groups with the 
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some improvement in terms of immigrants sorting themselves into 
safer jobs, a substantial portion, especially those in the riskiest quartile, 
do not do so.   
 
Figure 4: Risk Changes by Quartile, Mexican Immigrants (Percentages)73 
 
Figure 4 breaks out risk changes by quartile for Mexican 
immigrants, who represent 265 of the 2,158 immigrants for which 
complete data was available.  Here, the first quartile largely mirrored 
what occurred in the first quartile of Figure 3: about two-thirds of 
Mexican immigrants increased their fatality risk in the second wave of 
the NIS, while the remainder stayed in a similar risk group or decreased 
their overall fatality risk.  Likewise, the activity in the second and third 
quartiles in Figure 4 aligned with that of Figure 3.  Again, the most telling 
quartile in terms of how immigrants are doing in the labor market is the 
fourth, high-risk quartile.  Here, the movement between risk groups in 
the fourth quartile for Mexican immigrants mirrored the fourth quartile 
for all immigrants in Figure 3.  Approximately half of all Mexican 
 
 73 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at 
Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOI research file.  U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, supra note 61.  The risk-quartiles in Figures 3, 4, and 5 are as follows: 
The first quartile consists of the safest industry-occupation groups with the lowest 
fatality rates.  The second quartile includes the second safest industry-occupation 
groups.  The third quartile includes the third safest industry-occupation groups.  The 
fourth quartile includes the most dangerous industry-occupation groups with the 
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immigrants in this quartile increased their job risks or remained in the 
fourth riskiest quartile, while about half reduced their workplace 
fatality risks between the two waves.   
Finally, Figure 5 analyzes risk changes for non-Mexican 
immigrants.  Figure 5 largely mirrors the results illustrated in Figure 3.  
Again, the first quartile had the largest percentage of immigrant 
workers that moved to a higher-risk job.  The job movement in the 
second, third, and fourth quartiles largely mirrored that exhibited for all 
immigrants in Figure 3.  Notably, in the fourth and most dangerous risk 
quartile, just under half of all non-Mexican immigrants remained in the 
same risk group or increased their fatality risk. 
 
Figure 5: Risk Changes by Quartile, Non-Mexican Immigrants 
(Percentages)74 
 
Overall, Figures 3 through 5 show that many immigrants did not 
substantially migrate into safer jobs between the first and second waves 
of the NIS.  Certainly, many immigrants across all quartiles did move to 
a safer job.  But the fourth quartile of Figures 3, 4, and 5—which 
 
 74 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at 
Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOI research file.  U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, supra note 61.  The risk-quartiles in Figures 3, 4, and 5 are as follows: 
The first quartile consists of the safest industry-occupation groups with the lowest 
fatality rates.  The second quartile includes the second safest industry-occupation 
groups.  The third quartile includes the third safest industry-occupation groups.  The 
fourth quartile includes the most dangerous industry-occupation groups with the 
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represents the quartile with the most dangerous occupations—shows 
that a substantial portion of immigrants remained in high-risk jobs or 
increased their job risks.  Thus, while some immigrants improved, many 
did not, and this fact—coupled with the results in Sections III.B and V.D, 
infra—shows that immigrants still face many struggles in the 
workplace: they experience higher average fatality rates, are not 
compensated for their job risks, and, in many cases, remain locked into 
high-risk jobs over time.  The results developed in this Section also shed 
light on some of OSHA’s policies under the Bush Administration.  At this 
time, OSHA compiled several Spanish-language resources and created 
the Hispanic Workers Task Force to improve worker safety.75  Given that 
a large portion of the immigrant population remained in high-risk jobs 
or moved to high-risk jobs between 2003 and 2007, however, these 
trends suggest that the Bush Administration’s efforts were not sufficient 
to enable immigrant workers to transition into safer occupations.   
IV.  DO IMMIGRANTS GET PAID FOR RISKY JOBS?  THEORY OF THE VSL 
Part III of this Article demonstrated that immigrants experience a 
higher overall fatality rate than native workers and that a significant 
portion of immigrants remained in dangerous jobs over time.  The 
results developed in Part III may be less concerning, however, if it is also 
the case that immigrant workers receive compensation in the form of 
higher wages, or hazard pay, for their increased job risks.  Research in 
the economics literature suggests that immigrants do not receive wage 
compensation for their increased job risks, as reflected by the fact that 
their VSL is substantially lower than the VSL for native workers, and for 
some immigrant groups may even be zero.76  This Part discusses a 
theoretical explanation for why this may be the case.  To preview, 
immigrants receive lower hazard pay because they face a different 
wage-offer curve than native workers, resulting in a lower 
compensating differential for immigrants along with a lower 
accompanying VSL.77  Section A provides background information to 
better understand the VSL.  Section B describes the theoretical 
derivation of the VSL.  Finally, Section C explains in more detail why the 
VSL may differ for immigrant workers.  
 
 75 These policies are described in more detail in Part VI.  
 76 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 750.  
 77 Id.   
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A.  What is the VSL? 
The VSL quantifies the benefit of avoiding a fatality.  Today, the VSL 
estimates range from 9 to 11 million dollars.78  This figure reflects the 
total compensation required per expected workplace death.  To 
illustrate, suppose the average annual fatality rate for all workers is one 
death per 10,000 workers.79  Suppose also that in return for bearing this 
risk, workers receive an annual wage premium of $1,000.80  The amount 
of compensation that this group of workers would receive for one 
workplace death would therefore be $10,000,000 or 10,000*$1,000.  
Accordingly, the VSL would equal $10,000,000.  In general, then, the VSL 
can serve as a measure of whether workers receive compensation for 
their job risks.   
Though estimates of the VSL for workers generally are between 9 
and 11 million dollars, the estimated VSL for immigrants is much lower.  
In 2010, the estimated VSL for immigrants using the industry-
occupation fatality rate measure was $3.19 million, which, at the time, 
compared to a VSL of $8.8 million for native workers, indicates that 
immigrants receive less hazard pay than U.S.-born workers.81  Mexican 
immigrants fared particularly poorly as they received no net wage 
compensation for fatality risks, resulting in a VSL of zero for these 
workers.82  The following sections explain how immigrants can receive 
less compensation for job risks than native workers by first outlining 
the theoretical derivation of the VSL, followed by a theoretical rationale 
for why immigrants have a lower VSL than native workers.   
B.  Theoretical Derivation of the VSL 
The Value of a Statistical Life is grounded in the fundamental 
assumption that labor markets involve the exchange of goods and 
services between workers and firms.83  More dangerous jobs are 
generally less desirable to risk-averse workers, and so, holding 
everything else equal, these workers require higher wages to work 
 
 78 W. KIP VISCUSI, PRICING LIVES: GUIDEPOSTS FOR A SAFER SOCIETY 6 (2018).  
 79 Id.  
 80 Id.  The $1,000 figure is derived statistically and includes controls for workers and 
occupation characteristics.  
 81 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 763.  Estimates of the VSL using a different 
dataset, the NIS, showed that immigrants had a VSL between $9 and $13 million.  
Mexican immigrants still had a negative VSL, however.  Id. at 767   
 82 Id. at 767. 
 83 Thomas J. Kniesner & W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of a Statistical Life, OXFORD RSCH. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON. AND FIN. (2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190625
979.013.138. 
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those more dangerous jobs.84  In economic terms, this is referred to as a 
compensating differential.85  On the firm side, safer jobs are more costly 
for firms to provide, and, again holding everything else equal, firms will 
have to pay lower wages for safer jobs in a perfectly competitive 
environment, and some workers will accept the lower wages in return 
for safer jobs.86  This results in a locus of wage and job-risk combinations 
in which the quantity of labor demanded equals the quantity of labor 
supplied at every possible safety level.  In economic terms, this is 
referred to as the labor market hedonic equilibrium.   
The labor market hedonic equilibrium can be described 
algebraically by the equation w = w(p), where w represents the wage 
and p represents the probability of a fatal injury at work.87  In other 
words, the wage is a function of the job risk.  Furthermore, the more 
dangerous the job, the more firms must pay in wages, everything else 
the same, to attract workers to that job.  Note also that the proper 
comparison is within an industry and occupation across workplaces.  So 
even though lawyers have higher paid and safer jobs than construction 
workers, comparing lawyers to construction workers would be inapt.  
Rather, the focus is on situations such as test pilots being more highly 
paid than commercial airline pilots because test pilots face such a higher 
risk of death.88 
The graphical representation of the labor market hedonic 
equilibrium is a concave function, and the VSL directly follows from the 
numerical value of the slope of the labor market hedonic wage 
equilibria.89  To illustrate, consider an example similar to the one 
outlined in Section IV.A.  Suppose the probability of an accidental death 
in the workplace is one death per 10,000 workers.  Suppose also that the 
labor market reveals that for this level of risk the typical worker must 
be paid an extra $1,000 per year to accept a job that has this risk level.  
As a group, then, 10,000 workers would need to collect $10 million more 
to compensate them for the risk that one more of their number were to 
be killed in the next year.  In this example, then, the VSL is $10 million.90  
 
 84 Id.  
 85 Id.  
 86 Id.  
 87 Id.   
 88 Id.  Another example is for janitors.  Janitors who clean the inside of a nuclear 
reactor are paid about 16 times more than janitors who clean commercial office 
buildings.  Id.  
 89 Kniesner & Viscusi, supra note 83. 
 90 This is also the amount that the same group of workers would be willing to pay 
via wage reductions to have a safer job where one fewer worker in their group would 
be fatality injured.  Id.  
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More broadly, the VSL equals all the additional wage payments that 
employers must pay to compensate their workers for workplace fatality 
risk.   
Another important result at play here involves the sorting of 
workers to jobs in various firms.  Because of the nature of the labor 
market, firms with low workplace safety costs will hire those workers 
who are least willing to bear workplace risks.91  Similarly, firms with 
high safety costs will hire workers who are most willing to bear 
workplace risks that threaten their health or safety at work.92  In the 
most simplified theoretical version of the VSL, this sorting of workers to 
firms is economically efficient.  This simplified version assumes, 
however, that all workers face a common labor market offer curve.93  In 
practice, it may be the case that workers face different offer curves.  As 
explained in more detail in the following Section, this market 
segmentation explains why immigrants do not receive compensation for 
job risks.94  
C.  The VSL for Immigrant Workers 
This Section explains why the VSL may differ for immigrant 
workers.  This Article, along with previous research in economics,95 
shows that immigrants, especially those from Mexico, encounter large 
workplace fatality risks without receiving significant wage 
compensation in return.96  
The explanation for why immigrants fare worse in the labor market 
is grounded in standard economic wage theory.  To illustrate, begin with 
the same labor market described in Section IV.B.  Now, however, relax 
the assumption that all workers face the same wage-offer curve and 
instead let there be two offer curves, one for native workers and one for 
immigrants.97  Economists refer to a labor market characterized by two 
offer curves as a segmented labor market.98  So, even though immigrant 
workers may be able to choose from among the same set of jobs as 
native workers, they receive a lower level of compensation for each level 
of risk.99  Furthermore, segmented labor markets are theoretically 
 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id.  
 93 Id.  
 94 Id.  
 95 Id. at 749–50. 
 96 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 750. 
 97 Id.  
 98 Id. 
 99 Id.  
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possible so long as employers can distinguish between the two labor 
market groups and offer different sets of jobs based upon observable 
characteristics of one group.100  Immigrants can be readily identified by 
their potential employers, therefore they could face a different 
provision of wage-offer curves based upon their status as immigrants.101   
The next Part uses the theoretical insights developed here to design 
an empirical model that shows that immigrants fail to receive hazard 
pay for their workplace fatality risks.  
V.  RESULTS 
This Section uses data from the CPS to show that immigrants do not 
receive a wage premium for their workplace fatality risks.  We also show 
that this result holds for Mexican immigrants.  To reach this result, we 
leverage the theoretical insights developed in the previous Part to 
design an empirical specification that accounts for a segregated labor 
market in which immigrants face a different wage-offer curve than 
native workers.  Moreover, the results in this Part bolster the conclusion 
that immigrants suffer in the labor market relative to native workers.  
Section III.B showed that immigrants face a higher average fatality risk 
than native workers, Section III.C showed that a substantial portion of 
immigrants remains locked into high-risk jobs over time, and this Part 
empirically shows that immigrants do not receive hazard pay for job 
risks.  
This Part proceeds as follows.  Section A discusses the data used to 
derive these results.  Section B outlines our empirical specification.  
Section C discusses previous results in the economics literature showing 
that immigrants do not receive hazard pay for job risks.  Finally, Section 
D provides new evidence that immigrants, even in 2015, do not receive 
compensation for workplace fatality risks.  
A.  Data Sources  
This Section uses data from the CPS to estimate log-wage 
regression equations that test whether immigrants receive 
compensation for job risks.  The CPS is a large sample dataset that 
includes employment and demographic information for the native U.S. 
workforce along with information on a worker’s country of origin, which 
is used to determine whether the worker is an immigrant.102  We use the 
 
 100 Id. at 751. 
 101 Id. at 751. 
 102 National Bureau of Economic Research, Current Population Survey (CPS) Data at 
the NBER, https://www.nber.org/research/data/current-population-survey-cps-data-
nber (last visited February 9, 2021). 
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Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG), a subsample of the CPS, in 
our analysis because this sample includes information on the worker’s 
income.  The MORG also includes information on worker age, education, 
gender, race, occupation, and industry.  Summary statistics for the key 
variables of the log-wage regression equation used to estimate fatality 
risks are reported in Appendix Table 1.  We focus on 2007 and 2015 
because 2007 corresponds with the second year of the NIS survey and 
2015 is the most recent year for which our CFOI data is available.  To 
compare with the first wave of the NIS survey in 2003, we reference 
results from Hersch and Viscusi (2010), described in Section V.C.  
Overall, the results from these regressions can, in conjunction with 
results from the NIS survey, inform our understanding of how 
immigrants fare in the workplace.   
We made a number of restrictions to the sample to align with best 
practices in the economics literature.  First, we restricted the CPS 
sample to workers in occupations that were traditionally characterized 
as blue-collar jobs since the greatest job risks are associated with these 
occupations.103  This restriction is common throughout the VSL 
literature.104  We also limit the CPS samples to workers that are not self-
employed—since the CPS does not report earnings for self-employed 
workers—and to those with hourly wages from $1.50 to $100 and 
between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four.  Summary statistics for the 
variables included in this analysis are presented in Appendix Table 1. 
Appendix Table 1 shows that the average hourly wage in 2007 and 
2015 was $16.60 per hour and $19 per hour, respectively.  Experience 
ranged from 22 years in 2007 to 22.4 years in 2015.  Time spent 
receiving education was relatively constant across the two sample 
years, ranging from 12.5 and 12.8 years.  Union membership declined 
from 14.8 percent of the 2007 sample to 12.8 percent of the 2015 
sample.  The percent of white workers was roughly the same in 2007 
and 2015, ranging between 79.1 percent and 81.9 percent of each 
sample.  The percent of Hispanic workers increased between 2007 and 
2015—approximately 17.5 percent of the sample in 2007 was Hispanic 
compared to 18.8 percent in 2015.  The percentage of immigrants was 
18.9 percent in both 2007 and 2015.  Finally, the percentage of Mexican 
immigrants was 8.1 percent in 2007 and 7.5 percent in 2015. 
 
 103 These occupations are listed above in footnote 58. 
 104 See, e.g., Gentry & Viscusi (2016), supra note 51, at 92; Hersch & Viscusi, supra 
note 5, at 755.  
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B.  Empirical Specification 
The empirical specification applies the theoretical insights 
developed in Part IV.  We leverage the canonical log-wage equation used 
throughout labor economics to test whether immigrants are 
compensated for their workplace risks similarly to native workers.105  In 
short, this equation represents the log(Hourly Wage) for a given worker 
as a linear function of all of the worker’s individual characteristics, such 
as the worker’s education or gender, along with the worker’s particular 
job, the fatality rate for that job, and the worker’s immigrant status.  In 
this way, this regression specification permits us to estimate the effect 
of the worker’s workplace fatality risk while controlling for other factors 
that affect the worker’s wage, such as education, gender, or race.  This 
regression specification also permits a separate labor market 
equilibrium for immigrants that would differ in terms of the wage level 
and slope of the estimated wage-risk combination, as outlined above.106  
We achieve this separate equilibrium by including an indicator variable 
for whether the worker is an immigrant as well as an interaction term 
for immigrant status and the worker’s workplace fatality rate.107  
The log-wage equation takes the following form:  
 
The dependent variable in this equation is the log of wages for an 
individual worker.  The hourly wage is reported directly for most 
workers in the CPS, but we calculated the hourly wage for some workers 
by dividing weekly earnings by the worker’s usual weekly hours (CPS).  
Control variables are reflected by the vector X.  These variables include 
indicator variables for a worker’s race (White, Black, American Indian, 
Asian or Pacific Islander, or more than one race reported), Hispanic 
ethnicity, sex, marital status, union status, indicator variables for the 
worker’s broad occupation group, and indicators for whether the 
worker is employed by the government, employed full time, or paid on 
an hourly basis.  We also control for a worker’s education.  In the CPS, 
we impute education using the highest education attainment of a 
worker.  The CPS does not have specific information on work history.  
 
 105 See, e.g, Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Adjusting the Value of a Statistical Life for 
Age and Cohort Effects, 9 REV. ECON. & STAT. 573, 575 (2008); Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 
5, at 753. 
 106 Id.  
 107 Id.  
ln 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 +  
𝛽4 𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑥 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝜖 
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We therefore approximate experience by potential experience, which is 
defined as age minus years of education minus five.108   
The key variables in this regression are the fatality rate, a binary 
variable for immigrant status, and an interaction term, Immigrant x 
Fatality Rate.  We use the industry fatality rate measure in our primary 
regression.  Immigrant is a binary variable equal to one if the worker is 
an immigrant and zero otherwise.  The final term, Immigrant x Fatality 
Rate, represents the interaction between immigrant status and the 
fatality rate.  Including this term is worthwhile for two reasons.  First, as 
explained above, including the interaction term permits a separate labor 
market equilibrium for immigrant workers.  Second, interaction terms 
in general permit a more nuanced understanding of how immigrant 
workers are compensated for their fatality risks.  The interaction term 
lets us test whether the effect of the fatality rate on a worker’s wages 
differs based on whether the worker is an immigrant.  
C.  Results in the Previous Literature 
Before providing new estimates of immigrants’ failure to receive 
hazard pay, we show in this Section that our results align with previous 
results in the literature, implying that Mexican immigrants, in 
particular, continue to fail to receive wage compensation for the high 
fatality risks that they face.  Most notably, Hersch and Viscusi (2010) use 
the CPS and Wave 1 of the NIS to estimate log-wage equations similar to 
those used in this Article109 to test whether immigrant workers receive 
compensation for their workplace risks.  Hersch and Viscusi found that 
immigrants are concentrated in high-risk jobs and receive little to no 
boost in wages to compensate them for their on-the-job risks.110  They 
also showed that Mexican immigrants suffer: despite incurring much 
higher fatality risks than U.S. workers, Mexican immigrants receive no 
compensation for job risks.111  Hersch and Viscusi also calculated VSLs 
for all workers, immigrant workers, and Mexican immigrant workers.  
Using the CPS dataset, Hersch and Viscusi found that the VSL for native 
workers ranges from $8.8 million to $10.22 million while the VSL for 
immigrant workers ranges from -$3.64 million to $3.19 million, 
depending on the fatality rate measure used in the analysis.112  Using the 
NIS dataset, which only includes immigrants, Hersch and Viscusi found 
 
 108 This is the standard practice in the literature.  See, e.g., id. at 756. 
 109 See infra Section V.D. 
 110 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 749. 
 111 Id.  
 112 Id. at 763.  
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that the VSL for immigrants ranged between $7.21 and $9.35 million.113  
Immigrants from Mexico, however, receive no wage compensation for 
their job risks.  In fact, Hersch and Viscusi found that the VSL for these 
immigrants was negative.  
D.  New Estimates of Immigrant’s Failure to Receive Hazard Pay 
This Section provides new estimates illustrating that immigrants, 
particularly those from Mexico, fail to receive hazard pay for workplace 
fatality risks.  We first present results for immigrants generally before 
breaking our results into Mexican and non-Mexican immigrant groups. 
Table 3 presents estimates of the key risk and immigrant status 
variables using the CPS dataset for 2007 and 2015.  We focus on the 
results using the industry fatality rates for ease of analysis.  Overall, 
Table 3 shows that all workers receive a statistically significant 
compensating differential for fatality risks.  Immigrants, however, do 
not receive any compensation for the fatality risks they face on the job. 
Table 3 shows that all workers receive positive compensation for 
job risks because the coefficient of the fatality rate variable is positive 
and statistically significant at the five percent level.  We can therefore 
calculate the VSL for all workers in this specification.  The VSL for a 




Here, 𝐵2 represents the estimated coefficient for the fatality rate 
variable, the average wage is the average hourly wage for the sample, 
2,000 assumes a forty-hour workweek, and 100,000 normalizes the VSL 
since the fatality rate is measured per 100,000 workers.  Using this 
formula, the VSL in Table 3 for all workers is estimated at $9.6 million 
in 2007 and $10.7 million in 2015.  These results align with VSL 
estimated for 2003 in Hersch and Viscusi (2010), which was $9.9 million 





 113 Id. at 767.  
 114 Gentry & Viscusi, supra note 51, at 93. 
 115 See, e.g., Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 763.  
𝑉𝑆𝐿 = 𝐵2 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ 2,000 ∗ 100,000 
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Table 3: Log-Wage Regressions Based on Industry Fatality Rates, All 
Immigrants116 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 2007 2015 
   
Fatality Rate 0.0029** 0.0028** 
 (0.0004) (0.0006) 
Immigrant x Fatality Rate –0.0049** –0.0062** 
 (0.0009) (0.0011) 
Immigrant –0.0167* –0.0162* 
 (0.0071) (0.0074) 
   
Wage $16.61 $19.04 
   
Value of Statistical Life ($ Millions) $9.6 $10.7 
   
Observations 66,872 60,800 
R-squared 0.3462 0.3322 
 
Table 3 also shows that immigrants are not compensated for job 
risks because the coefficient on the interaction term, Immigrant x 
Fatality Rate, is negative and statistically significant.  This means that 
the VSL for immigrants is negative.  To illustrate, first note that 
calculating the VSL with an interaction term is similar to calculating the 
VSL from the standard log-wage equation.  Here, the relevant formula is  
     117 
 
Because 0.0019 + (-0.0036) is less than zero, the estimated VSL for 
immigrants is negative, which violates standard economic theory.118  
Accordingly, we instead estimate the amount of money that immigrants 
lose because they are not compensated for job risks relative to native 
workers.  To do this, first note that all workers receive compensation 
equal to the average fatality rate multiplied by the VSL:  
 
 
Applying this formula to the most recent data from 2015, we 
estimated that the VSL for all workers was approximately $10,700,000, 
and the average fatality rate, using industry as the index, was 3.5 deaths 
 
 116 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at 
Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOI research file.  U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, supra note 61.  Standard errors in parentheses: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + 
p<0.1. 
 117 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 761. 
 118 W. Kip Viscusi & Clayton Masterman, Anchoring Biases in International Estimates 
of the Value of a Statistical Life, 54 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 103, 104 (2017).  
𝑉𝑆𝐿 =  𝐵2 + 𝐵4 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ 2,000 ∗ 100,000 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑉𝑆𝐿 ∗ 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 
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per 100,000 workers.  Therefore, all workers received annual 
compensation of $374.50 in hazard pay.  Our results in Table 3, however, 
show that immigrants did not enjoy this level of compensation.  In fact, 
these results show that immigrants were underpaid by $505 for work in 
dangerous jobs relative to what they would have been paid in jobs 
without any fatality risk.119  This type of result would not be plausible if 
immigrants had broad access to these safer jobs.  Summing together the 
compensation for natives with immigrants’ lost wages shows that there 
is an $880 gap between native workers and immigrants in the average 
amount of compensation for occupational fatality risks.   
Next, to test how Mexican immigrant workers fared, we divided 
immigrant workers into two groups: Mexican and non-Mexican 
immigrants.  Table 4 presents estimates of the key risk and immigrant 
status variables for these two groups.  To understand the differential 
impact of risk on Mexican and non-Mexican immigrant workers, we 
interact each measure of the fatality rate with whether a worker is a 
Mexican immigrant or whether the worker is a non-Mexican immigrant.  
Thus, we end up with two interaction terms: Mexican Immigrant x 
Fatality Rate and non-Mexican Immigrant x Fatality Rate.120   
Table 4 shows the coefficient on the industry fatality rate variable 
is positive and statistically significant.  This yields a positive VSL for all 
workers of $9.4 million in 2007, and $11 million in 2015.  Again, these 
results align with the VSL estimated for 2003 in Hersch and Viscusi 
(2010), which was $9.9 million using the industry fatality rate 
measure.121  Using the same methodology as before and focusing on 
2015, this means that all workers received $385 in hazard pay.  Mexican 
immigrants do not receive hazard pay, however.  Across all three years, 
the interaction term Fatality Rate * Mexican Immigrant is negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that Mexican immigrants receive 
lower compensation for their fatality risk.  In 2015, this amounted to 
$932 in lost pay.  Non-Mexican immigrants fared better, however.  The 
coefficient on their interaction term was only negative and statistically 
significant in 2015, but this immigrant group still lost $189 as a result of 




 119 This calculation requires estimating a negative VSL for immigrants.  This negative 
VSL was approximately equal to negative $12.9 million in 2015.  The average fatality 
rate for immigrants was 3.9 deaths per 100,000 workers.  
 120 This is an accepted practice in the VSL literature.  See, e.g., Hersch & Viscusi, supra 
note 5, at 767.  
 121 See, e.g., Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 763.  
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Table 4: Log-Wage Regressions Using Industry Fatality Rates, Comparing 
Mexican and non-Mexican Immigrants122 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 2007 2015 
   
Fatality Rate 0.0029** 0.0029** 
 (0.0004) (0.0006) 
Mexican Immigrant x Fatality Rate –0.0075** –0.0077** 
 (0.0012) (0.0015) 
Mexican Immigrant –0.0094 –0.0074 
 (0.0112) (0.0117) 
Non-Mexican Immigrant x Fatality Rate –0.0016 –0.0045** 
 (0.0013) (0.0016) 
Non-Mexican Immigrant –0.0257** –0.0223** 
 (0.0082) (0.0086) 
   
Wage $16.61 19.04 
   
Value of Statistical Life (Millions) $9.4 $11.0 
   
Observations 66,872 60,800 
R-squared 0.3462 0.3322 
 
Overall, the results developed in this Section pair with those 
developed earlier in the paper to show that immigrants, particularly 
those from Mexico, fare quite poorly in the labor market.  Immigrants 
experience higher workplace fatality risks, do not always move to safer 




 122 The totals and calculations of fatal injury data were generated by researchers at 
Vanderbilt University with restricted access to the CFOI research file.  U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, supra note 61.  Standard errors in parentheses: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + 
p<0.1. 
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VI.  DISCUSSION 
The previous Parts empirically demonstrated that immigrant 
workers in the United States often suffer in the labor market, 
particularly compared to their native peers.  This Part leverages those 
results to comment on the efficacy of past OSHA programs designed to 
improve immigrant workplace safety and informs our policy 
recommendations for ways in which OSHA can further improve 
immigrant welfare on the job site.  Section A of this Part describes 
immigrant outreach programs conducted by the OSHA under the Bush, 
Obama, and Trump Administrations.  Section B then assesses the 
efficacy of these policies in light of the empirical conclusions reached in 
the previous Parts.  Finally, Section C outlines one modest and one more 
ambitious policy proposal that OSHA could adopt to improve 
immigrant-worker outcomes in the labor market.  
A.  OSHA Policies  
OSHA’s organic statute directs the agency to protect all workers in 
the workplace.  The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 states 
in its preamble that OSHA’s goal is to “assure safe and healthful working 
conditions for working men and women.”123  OSHA’s statutory charge 
includes immigrants, yet there has long been a perception that 
immigrant workers, particularly Hispanic workers, fare worse than 
native workers in terms of workplace safety.124  This is all the more 
concerning given that immigrants compose about 17 percent of the 
workforce and work in some of the most dangerous jobs in the 
country.125 
In fulfillment of its organic statute, OSHA has undertaken 
immigrant outreach programs under the Bush and Obama 
Administrations, and to a lesser extent under the Trump 
Administration, to improve immigrant workplace safety.  This Section 
first details some of these outreach programs before outlining some of 
the guidance documents and regulations that OSHA has promulgated to 
encourage employers to provide safety training in a language that their 
workers can understand. 
 
 123 29 U.S.C. § 651. 
 124 See, e.g., Henshaw, supra note 10; Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 794–51; Loh 
& Richardson, supra note 7, at 42.  
 125 See supra Section II.C.  
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1.  Immigrant Outreach Programs 
The Occupational Health and Safety Administration is tasked with 
“assuring safe and healthful working conditions for working men and 
women,”126 and has the statutory authority to promulgate rules and 
regulations to protect worker safety.  OSHA’s statutory charge includes 
immigrants,127 yet immigrant workers, particularly Hispanic workers, 
face higher workplace risks than native workers.128  This phenomenon 
has not escaped OSHA’s attention, and we next provide an overview of 
some of the OSHA initiatives and policies that have been put in place to 
address immigrant safety in the workforce.  
In 2002, then-Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA John Henshaw 
released a statement lamenting the number of deaths in the workforce, 
including the fact that Hispanic and Latino workers, many of them 
immigrants, bore a disproportionate share of those deaths.129  
Recognizing this problem, Secretary Henshaw announced that OSHA 
was creating a number of programs to reduce the number of fatal 
workplace injuries among non-English speaking workers, particularly 
Hispanic or Latino workers.130  These programs included creating a 
Hispanic Workers Task Force, establishing an 800 number for Spanish-
speaking individuals, initiating a national clearinghouse for training 
programs in Spanish, creating a Spanish-language website for 
employees and employers, and compiling a list of fluent Spanish-
speaking employees across OSHA.131  In addition to creating the Task 
Force, OSHA also used safety and health training grants to establish 
training programs for non-English speaking employees and employers 
that hire non-English speakers.  These programs were designed to 
reduce fatalities among the non-English speaking workforce.132   
During this time, OSHA also engaged in state and local outreach 
programs to address immigrant fatalities.  For instance, the Agency 
distributed a number of educational tools written in Spanish throughout 
Florida, such as a poster depicting four major construction hazards and 
a packet explaining the dangers of overhead power lines.133  In Fort 
Worth, OSHA also provided a ten-hour course on construction safety in 
 
 126 29 U.S.C. § 651. 
 127 See Henshaw, supra note 10.  
 128 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 749. 
 129 Henshaw, supra note 10.  
 130 Id. 
 131 Id.  
 132 Id.  
 133 Id.  The agency also offered two ten-hour construction classes in the Fort 
Lauderdale area after teaming up with a Florida consulting company that specializes in 
safety and health advice to small business.  Id. 
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Spanish, and the Fort Worth OSHA office worked with the Hispanic 
Chamber of Commerce to coordinate safety courses in Spanish.134  
Though these programs likely had localized successes in improving 
immigrant-worker safety, they were not systematically implemented on 
a nationwide basis.  Finally, the Task Force created a clearinghouse for 
Spanish safety and health training materials developed by others on the 
OSHA website.135  
OSHA’s policies toward immigrant workers in the early 2000s were 
also the subject of Congressional oversight.  In 2003, the Department of 
Labor released a report called “Evaluation of OSHA’s Handling of 
Immigrant Fatalities in the Workplace” at the request of Senator Charles 
E. Schumer.136  This report addressed how OSHA had been addressing 
immigrant workplace fatalities and focused on four questions: (1) how 
did OSHA keep track of immigrant fatalities, (2) what resources did 
OSHA allocate to investigating those deaths, (3) what resources does 
OSHA allocate to enforce workplace rules in industries that primarily 
employ immigrants, and (4) how can OSHA prevent more immigrant 
deaths?137  Regarding tracking immigrant workplace fatalities on the 
job, the DOL found that OSHA’s inspection priorities and reporting 
requirements did not distinguish between immigrant and non-
immigrant workers.138  Addressing the question regarding the resources 
OSHA allocated to investigating deaths, OSHA issued a memorandum 
directing its investigators to begin collecting information about 
workers’ ethnicity and language capabilities so that the Agency could 
better track immigrant versus non-immigrant fatalities.139  To address 
the third question asking what resources OSHA used to investigate 
industries that primarily employ immigrants, OSHA was unable to 
provide the information needed to determine the resources allocated to 
industries that primarily employed immigrants since the Agency did not 
specifically target those industries.140  Finally, with regard to how OSHA 
can reduce immigrant deaths, the Report directed OSHA to do more than 
just engage in Hispanic outreach efforts.141  For instance, the report 
stated that even though OSHA’s regional offices translated training 
 
 134 Id.  
 135 Henshaw, supra note 10.  
 136 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT NO. 21-03-023-10-001, 
EVALUATION OF OSHA’S HANDLING OF IMMIGRANT FATALITIES IN THE WORKPLACE iii (2003), 
https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2003/21-03-023-10-001.pdf.  
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at iv. 
 140 Id.  
 141 Id.  
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materials based on their knowledge of their region’s needs, they did not 
have a systematic process for doing so, and therefore could not 
systematically determine which languages and what literacy levels their 
documents needed to be translated into.142   
Finally, to help prevent further workplace fatalities, the report 
made several recommendations as to OSHA’s handling of immigrant 
workplace fatality investigations.143  For instance, the Report 
recommended that OSHA ensure that its staff has sufficient 
second-language capability and that the Agency issue an Interpretation 
Letter clarifying that OSHA’s “training provisions require employers to 
provide training in a manner that employees understand,” after taking 
into account the employee’s particular language abilities.144  The Report 
also recommended that OSHA examine the deterrent effect of increasing 
fines for willful violations that result in deaths.145  
These examples from the early 2000s are not exhaustive, but they 
do illustrate that OSHA has long been concerned with reducing job risks 
to immigrant workers, and this concern did not decrease under the 
Obama administration.  In April 2010, OSHA hosted the National Action 
Summit for Latino Worker Health & Safety.146  The Summit developed 
an agenda to address and prevent injuries and deaths among Hispanic 
and Latino workers, many of whom are immigrants.147  The Summit 
joined together more than five hundred people, including workers and 
representatives from labor unions, community organizations, employer 
associations, and government officials, to discuss ways to reduce Latino 
workplace fatalities, particularly in the construction industry, which is 
highly dangerous and employs a large number of Latino workers.148  
Follow-up summits and educational conferences were held in each 
OSHA region to build on the ideas developed in the national OSHA 
summit.149  Each of the summits was focused on providing vulnerable 
worker populations—such as immigrant populations—with education, 
training, and assistance.150  
 
 142 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 136, at iv. 
 143 Id. at v.  
 144 Id.  
 145 Id.  
 146 Press Release, Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Secretary of Labor to Convene National Action 
Summit on Latino Worker Safety and Health (Mar. 18, 2010), https://www.osha.gov/
archive/latinosummit/index.html. 
 147 Id.  
 148 Id.  
 149 Quick Takes, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN. (Dec. 1, 2020), 
https://www.osha.gov/quicktakes/12012010. 
 150 Id.  
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Finally, immigration policy has certainly been at the forefront of 
the Trump Administration’s agenda.  While there have been no major 
OSHA initiatives to address immigrant workplace fatalities, OSHA has 
maintained some immigrant outreach programs under the Trump 
administration.  For instance, the OSHA website lists training resources 
in Spanish for those that work in the construction industry.151  OSHA’s 
website also provides Spanish-language compliance assistance 
resources for employers.152  In addition, some OSHA regions have 
continued to engage in outreach programs with immigrant workers.  
OSHA Region VI—which includes Texas, New Mexico, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma, and Arkansas—partnered with the Workers Defense Project 
in Austin, Texas, to distribute safety materials to immigrant workers.153  
OSHA Region VI also offered eleven “in-take nights” to provide Hispanic 
workers with an opportunity to ask questions and file complaints with 
OSHA.154   
Immigrant workers have been a focus of OSHA’s attention for 
nearly two decades.  Yet a comprehensive understanding of how 
immigrant workers fare in the workplace is lacking in the legal 
literature.  This paper fills that gap, and in doing so also offers evidence 
that OSHA’s efforts over time have not reduced immigrant workplace 
fatalities.  
2.  Language Training Requirements  
In addition to outreach programs to train immigrant workers 
directly in workplace dangers, OSHA has also, to some extent, mandated 
that employers train immigrant workers in a language that they can 
understand.  Broadly, the Agency has issued guidance that employers 
must provide training in a language that employees can comprehend.155  
This requirement has been enforced in court.  In Modern Continental 
Construction Company, Inc. v. OSHRC, the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit upheld an OSHA penalty against an employer who failed to train 
 
 151 Training Resources in Spanish Language, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., 
https://www.osha.gov/dte/outreach/construction_generalindustry/spanish_training.
html (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
 152 Spanish-Language Compliance Assistance Resources, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/complianceassistance/index-hispanic (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
 153 Region 6 - Annual Alliance Report, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., 
https://www.osha.gov/alliances/regional/region6/alliance-annual-report_20190726 
(last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
 154 Id.  
 155 Memorandum from David Michaels, Assistant Sec’y for Occupational Safety and 
Health, to Reg’l Adm’rs (April 28, 2010), https://www.osha.gov/dep/standards-policy-
statement-memo-04-28-10.html. 
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its employees in safety procedures that could have prevented an 
accident when the employer only provided training materials in English 
“despite a large number of employees with limited English 
proficiency.”156 
In some settings, OSHA has also promulgated regulations that 
require employers to post warning signs or provide training in a 
language that workers can understand.  For instance, OSHA mandates 
that safety signs that warn workers of hazards “shall be understandable 
to all employees who may be exposed to the identified hazard.”157  In 
other words, OSHA requires warning signs to be posted in a language or 
manner that non-English speakers can comprehend and act on.  
Similarly, OSHA requires employers in the logging industry to “assure 
that all training materials used are appropriate in content and 
vocabulary to the educational level, literacy, and language skills of the 
employees being trained.”158   
These multilingual signage or training requirements do not extend 
to all settings, however.159  For instance, OSHA currently requires that 
employers with workers that may be exposed to hazardous chemicals in 
the workplace must prepare and implement a written Hazard 
Communication Program and provide Safety Data Sheets, training, and 
labeling.160  The OSHA website also highlights hazard communication 
requirements as key to preventing workers from injuring themselves 
with harmful chemicals.161  These regulations were last amended in 
2013 and currently do not mandate that hazard labels be in any 
language other than English,162 although OSHA guidance stresses that if 
employees receive job instructions in a language other than English, the 
 
 156 Modern Cont’l Const. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 305 
F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 157 29 C.F.R. § 1910.145(f)(4)(iv) (2021). 
 158 29 C.F.R. § 1910.266(i)(9) (2021).  
 159 See, e.g., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., TRAINING REQUIREMENTS IN OSHA 
STANDARDS (2015), https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha2254.pdf (collecting 
training requirements across dozens of OSHA rules and showing that few of the rules 
include requirements that training occur in a language workers can understand).  
 160 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(1). 
 161 Compliance Assistance Quick Start, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., 
https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/compliance_assistance/quickstarts/construction/index.h
tml#step2 (last visited Feb. 1, 2020). 
 162 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(f)(10) (2021) (“The employer shall ensure that workplace 
labels or other forms of warning are legible, in English, and prominently displayed on 
the container, or readily available in the work area throughout each work shift.  
Employers having employees who speak other languages may add the information in 
their language to the material presented, as long as the information is presented in 
English as well.”). 
VISCUSI & MARQUISS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2021  8:29 AM 
2021] PROTECTING IMMIGRANT WORKERS 977 
training and information conveyed under the Hazard Community 
Standard must also be in the worker’s language.163  
OSHA also has several training regulations to address dangers in 
the construction industry, but few of these expressly require training to 
take place in a language the worker can comprehend.  For example, 
OSHA requires that employers in the construction industry “shall have 
each employee who performs work while on a scaffold trained by a 
person qualified in the subject matter to recognize the hazards 
associated with the type of scaffold being used and to understand the 
procedures to control or minimize those hazards.”164  This regulation 
does not require this training to take place in a language that the 
employee can understand, however.  Falls are another common cause of 
death in the construction industry, and OSHA requires employers to 
provide a training program for “each employee who might be exposed 
to fall hazards,”165 though this regulation does not impose any language-
based training requirements.166   
In sum, OSHA’s training requirements span many industries and 
address numerous jobsite risks.  But few of these regulations expressly 
require employers to train their employees in a language that they can 
understand.  Indeed, these requirements do not even require training in 
Spanish despite the prevalence of Spanish-speaking workers in high-
risk trades.   
B.  Assessing OSHA’s Policies 
The empirical results developed in this Article can shed light on the 
past efficacy of OSHA’s policies to improve immigrant welfare in the 
workplace.  Before assessing OSHA’s programs, however, we highlight 
several key contributions to the literature.  First, we constructed fatality 
rates using some of the most recent 2015 CFOI data to show that 
immigrant workers, particularly those from Mexico, continued to have 
a higher fatality rate than native-born workers.  Second, we are the first 
researchers to use the NIS to provide a longitudinal assessment of 
whether new immigrants to the United States transition into safer jobs 
over time.  We showed that even though some immigrants certainly 
improved in terms of their job safety between 2003 and 2007, a 
substantial portion of immigrant workers either remained in high-risk 
 
 163 Frequently Asked Questions: Hazard Communication (HAZCOM), OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN, https://www.osha.gov/html/faq-hazcom.html#faq6 (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2020).  
 164 29 C.F.R. § 1926.454(a) (2021).  
 165 29 C.F.R. § 1926.503(a)(1) (2021). 
 166 See id.  
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jobs during this time or moved into even more dangerous occupations.  
Finally, we used the latest data from the CFOI and the CPS to show that, 
unlike native-born workers, immigrant workers did not receive hazard 
pay for workplace fatality risk.  This phenomenon was particularly 
striking for immigrant workers from Mexico.  Indeed, though native-
born workers earned between $375 and $385 in annual compensation 
for job risks in 2015, immigrant workers were underpaid by $505, and 
immigrants from Mexico were underpaid by $932.167  
In conjunction, these results shed light on ways in which OSHA can 
implement its policies to improve workplace safety for immigrant 
workers.  Under the Bush Administration, OSHA began to provide 
Spanish-speaking immigrant workers with Spanish-language resources.  
OSHA established an 800 number for Spanish-speaking workers and 
created a clearinghouse of Spanish-language safety materials online.168  
OSHA also engaged in some proactive outreach programs at that time as 
well through the Hispanic Worker’s Taskforce.169  But our results 
suggest that more ambitious outreach programs are needed to reduce 
immigrant fatality rates relative to those of native-born workers or 
enable immigrant workers to receive hazard pay.170  Table 1 shows that 
the native fatality rates, like those for immigrant workers, remained 
largely unchanged under the Bush Administration.171  This stability 
indicates that opportunities remain for policies to address the fatality 
rate gap. 
OSHA also engaged in outreach programs with immigrant workers 
under the Obama Administration.  One notable Obama-era OSHA policy 
was the National Action Summit for Latino Worker Health & Safety, 
which joined together nearly five hundred labor union leaders, 
community organizers, industry members, and government officials to 
design programs that would provide immigrant communities with 
education, training, and assistance.172  Although programs like this 
almost certainly helped reduce immigrant fatalities, even ambitious 
conferences do not necessarily translate into policies that substantially 
improve immigrant-worker safety.  We showed that the fatality rate for 
immigrants was higher than U.S.-born workers in 2007 and 2015 and 
that immigrants, especially those from Mexico, did not receive hazard 
 
 167 See supra Section V.D. 
 168 See supra Section VI.A. 
 169 Id.  
 170 See supra Section III.C. 
 171 See supra Section III.C. 
 172 See supra Section VI.A. 
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pay for bearing these risks.173  Immigrant fatality rates did not improve 
relative to those of native-born workers between 2007 and 2015, 
indicating that more ambitious policy efforts are needed to improve 
immigrant workers’ safety at the job site.   
C.  Policy Proposals 
We offer two proposals that OSHA could implement to improve 
workplace safety for immigrant workers.  First, we recommend that 
OSHA, subject to a benefit-cost test, should provide immigrant workers 
with safety materials in their native languages whenever the Agency 
engages in outreach programs to improve immigrant safety.  Prior 
research has shown that immigrants lacking English proficiency face 
especially high job risks and fail to receive hazard pay relative to native 
workers or other immigrant groups.174  Communicating risks and safety 
precautions in Spanish, or the immigrant’s native language, could have 
significant returns in terms of workplace safety for immigrant workers 
that lack English proficiency.  Thus, our more modest proposal 
recommends that OSHA identify which of its outreach programs most 
efficiently identifies an immigrant worker’s native language so that 
OSHA can distribute safety materials in that language.   
Our more ambitious proposal recommends that OSHA promulgate 
regulations requiring employers of non-English speaking workers to 
translate all safety materials—whether those be chemical labels, safety 
data sheets, or training manuals—into a language the worker can 
comprehend whenever the benefits of doing so exceed the costs.  To be 
sure, we recognize that OSHA currently has a broad guidance policy that 
employer’s train employees in a language their employees can 
understand along with requirements that mandate multilingual training 
in some circumstances—such as the requirement that some safety signs 
be posted in a language that workers comprehend,175 or that training 
programs in the logging industry are conducted in a worker’s native 
language.176  These multilingual training requirements are not 
universal, however.  As we note in Section VI.A, risks posed by 
hazardous chemicals, along with training related to scaffolding or falls 
in the construction industry, do not expressly need to be conveyed in a 
language that workers can understand.177  
 
 173 See supra Section III.C. 
 174 Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 768. 
 175 29 C.F.R. § 1910.145(f)(4)(iv) (2021). 
 176 29 C.F.R. § 1910.266(i)(9) (2021). 
 177 29 C.F.R. § 1926.454(a) (2021); 29 C.F.R. § 1926.503(a)(1) (2021). 
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Accordingly, we recommend that OSHA conduct a benefit-cost 
analysis to determine when to promulgate regulations mandating that 
employers provide multilingual safety and training materials.  One 
regulation likely to pass a benefit-cost test is mandating that employers 
provide training or safety materials in Spanish.  Here, the benefits 
include lives saved and injuries averted from the Spanish-language 
safety materials, while the costs will be primarily driven by compliance 
costs for employers.  Of course, these regulations can be tailored as 
needed to particular industries or occupations that employ a large 
portion of Spanish-speaking workers to minimize unnecessary 
compliance costs.  Next, looking beyond Spanish-language 
requirements, it is likely that OSHA regulations for other languages 
could also pass a benefit-cost test for dangerous occupations that 
employ large numbers of non-English and non-Spanish speaker 
workers.  We accordingly recommend that OSHA investigate which 
occupations those may be and promulgate regulations accordingly.  
Finally, as a safety valve to minimize compliance costs, we suggest that 
OSHA include a provision in its regulations that employers need not hire 
workers with whom they cannot communicate.  This would ensure that 
small employers could comply with OSHA’s regulations without putting 
immigrant workers at risk. 
Overall, our proposed regulatory scheme would encourage 
employers to provide training manuals, chemical warnings, and verbal 
training in a language that workers can comprehend and act on.  By 
educating immigrant workers about job risks, these workers are better 
able to select jobs that will compensate them for those risks or transition 
into safer jobs with lower fatality rates.  As a result, immigrant workers 
can become safer, and the gap between immigrant and worker fatality 
rates can begin to close.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Immigrant workers composed between 10 and 15 percent of the 
workforce between 2003 and 2015 and make up a significant portion of 
workplace fatalities.178  OSHA is tasked with improving safety for all 
workers, including immigrants, and OSHA has undertaken a number of 
initiatives directed specifically at immigrant job safety.179  But despite 
these programs, we show that immigrants still suffer in the workplace 
in a number of ways: they have higher average fatality rates than native 
workers, remain trapped into dangerous jobs over time, and do not 
 
 178 See supra Section III.B. 
 179 See supra Section VI.A.  
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receive compensation for job risks.  These results have implications for 
OSHA.  Though OSHA’s programs under the Bush and Obama 
Administrations certainly improved workplace safety for many 
immigrants, we suggest that OSHA could be doing more.  In particular, 
given prior research showing the importance of English proficiency in 
receiving hazard pay,180 we recommend that OSHA focus on providing 
safety materials to immigrants in the immigrant’s native language.  
Alternatively, OSHA could take a more aggressive stance and 
promulgate regulations mandating that employers also provide training 
and safety materials in Spanish when the benefits of doing so exceed the 
costs.    
 
 180 Hersch and Viscusi, supra note 5, at 768. 
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APPENDIX 
This Appendix first includes summary statistics for the CPS sample 
used to conduct our regression analysis in Appendix Table 1. 
Appendix Table 1: Current Population Survey Summary Statistics 






Wage (Dollars/Hour) 16.6 9.9 19.0 11.9 
Experience 22 12.2 22.4 12.7 
Education 12.5 2.6 12.8 2.7 
Age 39.5 12.0 40.19 12.5 
Union (Percent) 14.8 35.6 12.8 33.4 
Government (Percent) 12.6 33.2 12.2 32.7 
Hispanic (Percent) 17.5 38 18.8 39 
Immigrants (Percent) 18.9 39.2 18.9 39.1 
Mexican Immigrants (Percent) 8.1 27.2 7.5 26.4 
Married (Percent) 55.2 49.7 51.1 50 
White (Percent) 81.9 38.5 79.1 40.6 
Black (Percent) 10.8 31 12.3 32.8 
Native American (Percent) 1.2 10.9 1.4 11.8 
Asian (Percent) 4.4 20.6 5.6 22.9 
 
 
